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Which Felonies Pose a ‘‘Serious Potential Risk of Injury’’
for Federal Sentencing Purposes?
For some time now, the Supreme Court has struggled to
develop a coherent approach to determining which felony
convictions qualify under the so-called ‘‘residual clause’’ of
the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).1 Federal prose-
cutors have charged dozens, perhaps hundreds, of different
state felony convictions under the residual clause in order
to obtain a mandatory minimum sentence enhancement.2
Three justices have expressed a sense of hopelessness that
the Court will ever develop a satisfactory test for deter-
mining which ones qualify. Justices Thomas and Alito have
implored Congress to abolish the residual clause and
replace it with an exhaustive list of enumerated felonies.3
Justice Scalia has repeatedly called on the Court to declare
the residual clause unconstitutionally vague.4
In its most recent decision interpreting the residual
clause, Sykes v. United States, the Court extensively cited
empirical data about the dangerousness of various crimes,
including the one at issue there (eluding a police officer in
a motor vehicle), as well as two offenses that ACCA
explicitly denominates as ‘‘violent’’—burglary and arson.5
Although the Sykes Court made it clear that ‘‘statistics are
not dispositive,’’6 it nonetheless embraced an approach that
presumptively determines a felony to qualify under the
residual clause if it is at least as dangerous as the four
felonies explicitly listed in ACCA—burglary, arson, extor-
tion, and use of explosives. Because the statistics on eluding
a police officer in a motor vehicle suggested that that
offense is at least as dangerous as burglary and arson, and
because common sense supported that notion, the Court
held that offense to qualify under the residual clause.
Empirical data tend to be more useful for comparison
purposes when they spring from a common source and
methodology. In Sykes, the Court was forced to use data
from different studies that apparently used different gath-
ering methods. We have conducted a simple study using an
existing data source, the Uniform Crime Reporting Pro-
gram’s (UCR) National Incident-Based Reporting System
(NIBRS) to compare the co-occurrence of various offenses
and injury.7 In this article, we present our findings and
make some recommendations. We do not claim to have
solved the residual clause problem; not nearly enough data
are available for comprehensive recommendations. In any
event, data in and of themselves are incapable of inter-
preting a statute. Only judges can do that (authoritatively).
Nevertheless, we offer these findings and
recommendations in the hope that they will help the
interpretive process and spur additional data gathering.
Before discussing our research, however, we briefly
review the problem. ACCA is a federal antirecidivism stat-
ute authorizing punishment for felons caught in posses-
sion of a firearm.8 If the defendant has fewer than three
qualifying prior convictions, he or she may be sentenced to
a maximum of ten years in prison.9 If he has three or more
qualifying convictions, he must be sentenced to a mini-
mum of fifteen years.10
ACCA divides qualifying prior convictions into two
main groups—‘‘serious drug offenses’’11 and ‘‘violent felo-
nies.’’12 The statute then gives three alternative definitions
of violent felonies: (1) those involving force or threat of
force; (2) burglary, arson, extortion, or use of explosives; or
(3) any other felony that ‘‘presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another.’’13 The problem with the third
clause, known as the residual clause, is that it begs the
question, How much risk is serious? Aside from the
potential arbitrariness of judicial specification of risk levels,
there is a basic problem of metric. How does a court mea-
sure risk?
That, in a nutshell, is the problem. As noted above, the
Sykes Court has already embraced a solution: supplement
common sense about the riskiness of various offenses with
empirical data about how often the commission of those
offenses is accompanied by actual injuries. Our aim is to
help by providing some data drawn from a common source,
NIBRS.
I. Methodology and Background on National
Incident-Based Reporting System
This study uses data from the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation’s UCR, specifically NIBRS. The UCR is one of two
official national measures of crime in the United States and
is based on data collected by the FBI from local and state law
enforcement agencies. Historically the UCR collected
aggregate-level information for eight Part I offenses.14 With
the exception of homicides, these agency-level counts pro-
vided no details about any particular crime incident. More
recently, the UCR started converting to NIBRS. For pur-
poses of this study, NIBRS has two important features: (1) it
expands the UCR data collection from eight offenses to
forty-six offenses known to police, and (2) it gathers
incident-level details including information regarding the
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offenses, victims, offenders, and arrestees (if any).15 Of
particular interest for the current project is the information
gathered on whether the victim suffered any injuries in
connection with the criminal incident. It should be noted
that NIBRS groups together multiple criminal offenses if
they were part of the same criminal incident as determined
by the reporting agency. What this study measures, then, is
the percentage of incidents involving the stated offense that
also involve an injury to any victim.
This study relies on the incident data from the 2010
NIBRS Extract Files, which constitutes one of the most
recent years of publicly available data. In 2010, the NIBRS
file included 4,998,914 incidents.16 Of these incidents, 10.5
percent or 526,280 involved an actual injury. For present
purposes, to be counted as involving an injury, at least one
of the victims involved in the criminal incident must have
suffered at least a minor injury.17 For NIBRS injury coding
purposes, homicides by definition are excluded since the
victim is dead. For our purposes, all homicides were
recoded and designated as involving a ‘‘fatal’’ injury.
For this project, four main caveats must be considered
in relying on NIBRS data. One caveat in analyzing NIBRS
data is its limited coverage. NIBRS represents a substantial
departure in the UCR’s crime data collection for law
enforcement agencies and requires a lengthy certification
process. As a result, the conversion to NIBRS has been
gradual. By 2010, thirty-two states were NIBRS certified.
Within these thirty-two states, not all agencies submit data
in NIBRS format, as only fifteen states report all their UCR
crime data in NIBRS format. NIBRS agencies covered
approximately 30 percent of the U.S. population in 2010.18
Law enforcement agencies that participate in NIBRS tend to
represent smaller population areas. In 2010, the Fairfax
County (VA) Police Department was the only agency cov-
ering a population of more than one million that partici-
pated in NIBRS.19 Because participation in NIBRS is
voluntary, NIBRS states and law enforcement agencies do
not constitute a representative sample of U.S. law enforce-
ment agencies or states. This nonrepresentativeness of
NIBRS suggests exercising caution when interpreting the
results and generalizing beyond the NIBRS-participating
agencies included in this study.20
A second issue concerns the limited list of crimes
included in NIBRS. Although NIBRS greatly expands the
number of crimes for which the UCR collects data, it does
not cover all crimes reported to and known by law
enforcement. In particular, NIBRS does not cover many of
the offenses often involved for purposes of the residual
clause. Notable examples are escape (from prison or from
custody)21 and resisting arrest.22 A third caveat is that the
UCR defines a criminal incident and classifies particular
crimes in a way that may differ from prosecutorial deci-
sions. For UCR purposes, a crime incident is ‘‘one or more
offenses committed by the same offender, or group of
offenders acting in concert, at the same time and place.’’23
In addition, UCR offenses are classified based on infor-
mation from the initial police investigation. As a result of
both of these data collection practices, some differences
may arise between the offenses in the criminal incident
initially reported and the charges on which the offender is
arrested and ultimately prosecuted.
Finally, the NIBRS definitions of offenses are by design
uniform and therefore can be at variance with specific state
statutory offenses that superficially go by the same name.
Appendix A contains the NIBRS definitions for select
offenses.
Notwithstanding these caveats, the present study uses
NIBRS because it constitutes the single most comprehen-
sive crime database that collects information on victim
injuries.
II. Findings
Table 1 summarizes the percentage of incidents involving
each specified crime in which a victim reported some type
Table 1. Actual (fatal and non-fatal) injuries reported by










Sexual Assault With An Object 24.40%
Forcible Sodomy 19.66%
Forcible Fondling 9.15%
Weapon Law Violations 5.36%
Extortion/Blackmail 4.41%
Bribery 3.71%
Destruction/Damage/Vandalism of Property 2.77%
Purse-snatching 1.71%
Pocket-picking 1.69%




Burglary/Breaking and Entering 1.02%
Stolen Property Offenses 0.74%
Statutory Rape 0.71%
Pornography/Obscene Material 0.67%
All Other Larceny 0.63%
Assisting or Promoting Prostitution 0.63%
Motor Vehicle Theft 0.49%
Theft From Building 0.49%
Shoplifting 0.39%





False Pretenses/Swindle/Confidence Game 0.23%
Betting/Wagering 0.17%




Theft From Motor Vehicle 0.09%
Credit Card/Automatic Teller Machine Fraud 0.07%
Theft of Motor Vehicle Parts/Accessories 0.06%
Wire Fraud 0.04%
Source: Data from the NIBRS 2010 CODEBOOK, supra note 16.
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of physical injury. We have bolded three of the offenses that
Congress explicitly listed in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) as
violent crimes. (NIBRS has no easy comparison point for
crimes involving the ‘‘use of explosives,’’ which is the
fourth offense clearly identified by Congress as violent.)
Because Congress denominated these offenses as violent,
the Court has previously treated them as valuable compar-
ison points when determining which other offenses are
sufficiently dangerous to warrant their inclusion in the
residual clause.
It is difficult not to notice a clear separation between
crimes that necessarily involve nonconsensual touching of
victims (or threat thereof) and ones that do not.24 Assault,
kidnapping, robbery, and forcible sex offenses all involve
associated injuries in the double digits (except forcible
fondling, which is very close). Much of this pattern is likely
attributable to the inherent definitions of these crimes
and, in turn, the way in which NIBRS information is col-
lected. NIBRS requires injury information to be recorded
with respect to every assault, kidnapping/abduction, rob-
bery, forcible rape, forcible sodomy, sexual assault with an
object, forcible fondling, and extortion/blackmail.25 This
information must be recorded even if the response is
‘‘none’’ (i.e., no injury occurred). NIBRS requires injury
information for these crimes because the NIBRS defini-
tions of these crimes mention injury or risk of injury. The
NIBRS definitions of the remaining crimes listed in Table
1 do not mention risk of injury. As such, these offenses are
counted as involving an injury only if they co-occur with
the offenses listed above, and if there is an actual injury.
Such a second offense and injury could occur to the same
victim, or to a second victim, involved in the incident. For
example, a purse-snatching is counted as involving an
injury for purposes of Table 1 if the purse-snatching victim
also incurred another offense where injuries are recorded
(such as forcible rape) and an actual injury occurred to the
purse-snatching/rape victim. Alternatively, another per-
son in the purse-snatching incident could have been the
victim of an offense where injuries are recorded and suf-
fered an actual injury (such as an aggravated assault with
a broken bone). For the crimes that are not defined as
involving a risk of injury, the probability is rather low that
they will be counted in Table 1 as involving an injury given
the double filter of co-occurrence and actual injury
through with they must pass.
Subject to the same observation about the NIBRS
method of information collection, it is notable that the
ACCA-enumerated offenses (other than use of explosives)
are rarely associated with physical injury.26 Arson and
burglary/breaking-and-entering come in around one
percent. Extortion comes in significantly higher at 4.41
percent, which may be partly attributable to the fact that
NIBRS does collect injury information for this crime. The
percentage of victims injured in extortion incidents,
though, is low compared to any of the offenses that neces-
sarily involve nonconsensual touching of victims. If the
ACCA-enumerated offenses create a risk threshold for
other felonies—as precedent has treated them—it is a low
threshold indeed.
One less obvious observation concerns weapons law
violations, whose 5.36 percent co-occurrence with injury
puts it somewhat in the middle range behind the crimes
involving nonconsensual touching and ahead of arson and
other crimes with less than one percent of the victims
injured. Of course, weapons law violations do not neces-
sarily involve nonconsensual touching of victims. They do
tend to co-occur with other dangerous offenses that nec-
essarily involve the use of force. A quick examination of
the NIBRS data reveals that indeed, weapons law viola-
tions not uncommonly co-occur with such forcible crimes
as robbery, simple assault, and aggravated assault.27 This
statement is not true concerning any of the listed offenses
with injury percentages lower than weapons law
violations.
III. Implications and Analysis
It is fair to say that the Supreme Court and lower federal
courts alike have struggled with the application of ACCA’s
residual clause. These courts have held that a variety of
crimes qualify under the residual clause as presenting
‘‘a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,’’
including eluding a police officer in a motor vehicle,28
various sex crimes,29 kidnapping,30 some weapons law
violations,31 and many others. Courts have also concluded
that some crimes do not qualify under the residual clause,
including some nongeneric burglaries,32 some other
weapons law violations,33 driving under the influence, 34
some criminal conspiracies,35 and domestic violence,36
among others.
Courts have not used a single mode of reasoning to
determine which felonies warrant inclusion under the
residual clause. From its first residual clause case, James v.
United States,37 the Supreme Court acknowledged the
potential probative value of statistics in applying ACCA’s
residual clause. There, the Court approvingly cited the
United States Sentencing Commission’s determination,
based on empirical analysis, that criminal attempts should
be treated the same as their target offenses for purposes of
the ‘‘crime of violence’’ residual clause in the Sentencing
Guidelines,38 which is virtually identical to the violent
felony residual clause in ACCA.39 Notwithstanding this
nod in the direction of statistics, the analysis in James
rested principally on the logical supposition that
attempted burglary presented a similar, if not greater, risk
of injury than completed burglary. According to the Court,
a completed burglary is less likely to result in confronta-
tion with a startled homeowner than an attempted bur-
glary, which always ends in an interception of some
sort.40
In Begay v. United States,41 the Court used analogical
reasoning to find that driving under the influence was too
unlike burglary, arson, extortion, or use of explosives. The
latter crimes all involve purposeful, violent, or aggressive
conduct; drunk driving—a strict liability offense—does
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not.42 The Court did not deny that the felonies enumerated
in ACCA set a quantitative point of reference for risk, but it
asserted that the enumerated felonies set a qualitative
standard as well.
In Chambers v. United States,43 the Court used two forms
of reasoning to determine that failure to report to a penal
institution did not qualify under the residual clause.44 As
with driving under the influence in Begay, the Court in
Chambers found that failure to report did not involve pur-
poseful, violent, or aggressive conduct. The Court also cited
a Sentencing Commission study in which zero out of 160
cases of failure to report involved an injury.45 The govern-
ment countered with a study showing three cases of injury
arising from failure-to-report incidents, but the Court
pointed out that the study cited by the government covered
thirty years, whereas the Sentencing Commission study
covered only two years.
The Court’s opinion in Sykes relied more heavily on
statistics than any of its three previous residual clause
decisions. In Sykes, the conviction in question was for
fleeing a police officer by way of motor vehicle. The majority
emphasized the importance of statistics in ‘‘confirming
commonsense conclusions’’ about the dangerousness of
a criminal offense.46 The majority cited statistics from the
International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) to
measure injuries from police pursuits, the Bureau of Jus-
tice Statistics (BJS) to measure injuries from burglaries,
and the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) to measure
injuries from arson.47 Using the IACP data, the Court
estimated that police pursuits result in approximately
4 injuries per 100 pursuits.48 By comparison, the BJS
estimated that burglaries result in only 3.2 injuries per 100,
and the USFA put the injury rate in arson cases at around
3.3 per 100 incidents.49 Because Congress explicitly iden-
tified burglary and arson as inherently dangerous offenses
in ACCA, and because the injury frequency of police pur-
suits was higher than either burglary or arson, the majority
found that fleeing a police officer in an automobile was
a sufficiently dangerous criminal act to warrant inclusion in
the residual clause.50
James, Sykes, and Chambers demonstrate that the Court
has turned to some empirical or statistical evidence in
interpreting the residual clause. The methodological
approach taken by the Court thus far, though, has been
somewhat inconsistent and haphazard. The Court has
gathered statistical evidence from a range of sources, each
using varying methodologies and definitions. Take the
statistics on the dangerousness of police pursuits used by
the Court in Sykes. This evidence came from a 2008 study
published by the IACP reporting the results of an annual
online survey of around twenty-three police agencies per
year between 2001 and 2007.51 The survey authors warned,
as a result, that the data from the survey should not be
viewed as a representative sample of American law
enforcement agencies.52 Participation was voluntary.53
Although this study provides valuable information about
the dynamics and differences in police pursuit policies and
outcomes throughout the country, the injury frequencies
are not presented as nationally representative. The authors
of the study themselves warned that pursuit injury data
sometimes demonstrate a bias toward pursuits that result
in accidents or injuries, meaning that verifiable conclusions
cannot be drawn from most samples.54 Nevertheless, the
Court did exactly that in Sykes, taking the injury rate from
the IACP sample and using it as a comparison point with
injury rates from other crimes.
Using multiple, different statistical resources for
comparison purposes is problematic for two reasons.
First, the injury frequencies derived from each study are
not necessarily representative of the actual injury fre-
quencies for those offenses nationwide. The IACP study
used in the Sykes case illustrates this problem. Although
interesting, the sample size of the report raises questions
about the representativeness of the sample. The injury rate
from the IACP study should be seen as merely a rough
approximation using an imperfect data set. Although such
an injury statistic is valuable for developing theory, it is not
well suited for fine-grained comparison with injury fre-
quencies associated with other crimes. Yet this is exactly
how the Court used the IACP study in Sykes. Rather than
treating the case as a rough approximation of the relative
dangerousness of police pursuits, the majority directly
compared this injury figure with figures derived from
other studies measuring the dangerousness of other
offenses. The Court ultimately concluded that the ‘‘risk
level[s]’’ of burglaries (3.2 injuries per 100 incidents) and
arsons (3.3 injuries per 100 incidents) are ‘‘20% lower
than . . . vehicle pursuits.’’55 This would be a useful com-
parison if the Court trusted the representativeness and
accuracy of each of the studies used to derive these num-
bers. But given the studies’ limitations, such comparisons
are questionable.
Second, the various quantitative resources that the
Court has relied upon in interpreting the residual clause
use distinct methodological approaches. In some cases, the
statistics that the Court has cited do not actually even
measure what the Court apparently intended to quantify.
This further makes accurate comparisons of injury fre-
quencies between different resources problematic.
The Court’s use of the BJS study in Sykes is demon-
strative of this problem. In that report, the BJS collected
data from the National Crime Victimization Survey
(NCVS) on household burglaries.56 Data from the NCVS
comes from a statistically representative survey of Amer-
icans about their experience with crime victimization. But
the NCVS classifies burglary as a property crime and does
not collect data on injury rates.57 Therefore, that study
analyzed the co-occurrence of burglary with other violent
crimes, and the subsequent injuries resulting from these
violent crimes. The study also focused exclusively on
household burglaries.58 The Court has ‘‘held that a defen-
dant can receive an ACCA enhancement for burglary only
if he was convicted of a crime having ‘the basic elements’
of generic burglary—i.e., ‘unlawful or unprivileged entry
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into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with the
intent to commit a crime.’’’59 This means that a burglary
might fall under the ACCA for enhancement purposes
even if it involves a nonresidential structure. But the Court
in Sykes used the injury data from household burglaries to
conclude that the ‘‘approximately 3.7 million
burglaries . . . each year in the United States . . . resulted
in . . . approximately 118,000 injuries, or 3.2 injuries for
every 100 burglaries.’’60 The metric used by the Court
only measures burglaries of households, not burglaries of
any structure. Although the NVCS contains no data on
injuries associated with burglaries of other structures, the
rate of injury is likely lower than that of household bur-
glaries. After all, the BJS report explicitly identifies a bur-
glar’s likelihood of encountering a household member as
the source of victimization.61 Thus the rate of injuries
associated with burglaries, as defined by the ACCA, is
likely lower than that identified in the BJS report used in
the Sykes case.
The data we present from NIBRS may represent
a methodological approach that remedies many of these
concerns. The NIBRS data comes from a large group of
police departments—approximately 30 percent of all law
enforcement agencies spanning thirty-two states and cov-
ering nearly five million separate incidents. NIBRS uses
a consistent methodological approach to collect data on
many different criminal offenses. This allows for more
comparable examination of injury percentages across dif-
ferent offenses. Of course, NIBRS has some limitations as
well, as we identified in Part I. Nonetheless, we believe that
it can serve as a valuable tool in comparing the relative
dangerousness of various offenses.
In its residual clause jurisprudence to date, the Court
has tried to compare the dangerousness of crimes explic-
itly mentioned in the ACCA (burglary, extortion, arson,
and use of explosives) with crimes that might fall within
the ambit of the residual clause. This approach may well
represent sound statutory interpretation. If the Court
employs such an approach, however, it makes sense to (1)
use a consistent methodology, (2) draw empirical data
from a single source when doing comparisons, if possible,
and (3) ensure that the definitions of various criminal
offenses used in the data source generally map onto the
offense definitions used in the relevant case. NIBRS data
should not be conclusive in deciding whether a crime
‘‘presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another.’’62 That said, the data we present could be
a valuable resource in making dangerousness determina-
tions under the residual clause.
IV. Specific Recommendations
A. Assault
Any offense that contains assault as an element should
qualify under the residual clause. Even simple assaults are
associated with injury 55 percent of the time. It should be
noted that the NIBRS definition of simple assault is limited
to ‘‘an attack,’’63 whereas the American majority rule on
assault appears to include attempted batteries and incidents
where the victim is merely placed in reasonable apprehen-
sion of a battery.64 Still, it seems very unlikely that use of
this expanded definition of ‘‘simple assault’’ would produce
a figure below 4 percent.65 When Table 1 is considered as
a whole, it becomes clear that the highest percentage of
injuries occur when nonconsensual touching of a victim is
involved. In the absence of empirical evidence, at least two
circuits have concluded that some assault convictions do
not qualify under the residual clause on the ground that
they present insufficient risk of injury66; we think these
decisions should be reconsidered.
B. Weapons Law Violations
All weapons law violations should be regarded as suffi-
ciently risky to be included within the residual clause.
At 5.36 percent, a higher percentage of these violations is
associated with injury than burglary or arson, and a slightly
greater percentage is associated with injury than extortion.
However, our conclusion is limited to a quantitative com-
parison of weapons law violations with ACCA-enumerated
offenses. Some weapons law violations arguably do not
involve ‘‘purposeful, violent, or aggressive’’ conduct, which
is the qualitative measure dictated by Begay. The lower
courts are split on whether possession and carrying of
firearms convictions fall within the residual clause. Many of
the cases concern possession of a sawed-off shotgun, with
the majority of circuits holding that it qualifies under the
residual clause.67 Some cases involve carrying a concealed
weapon.68
C. Statutory Rape
Statutory rape should be regarded as insufficiently risky to
be included within the residual clause. At 0.71 percent, it is
well below extortion and marginally below burglary and
arson. This recommendation would not change existing
law, as lower courts have treated statutory rape as falling
outside the residual clause.69 We make no recommenda-
tion regarding other child sex offenses where the age
threshold is lower than for statutory rape. Although it is
true that many child sex offenses can be committed by
consensual contact, such as California Penal Code Section
288(a) (lewd and lascivious conduct with a child under
14),70 we cannot conclude that such offenses necessarily
should be regarded as falling outside the residual clause.
It seems likely that, the lower the threshold age for the
minor, the less probable that there has been willing coop-
eration in the sexual acts.
D. Nongeneric Burglary
Consider grouping all nongeneric burglaries together as
a single category and treating the entire category as not
qualifying under the residual clause. NIBRS defines bur-
glary as ‘‘[u]nlawful entry into a building or other structure
with the intent to commit a felony or a theft.’’71 Even
limited to structures, the NIBRS version of burglary was
122 FEDERAL SENTENCING REPORTER • VOL . 26 , NO . 2 • DECEMB ER 2013
This content downloaded from 74.217.200.33 on Thu, 25 Jun 2015 13:32:57 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
associated with injury in only 1.02 percent of incidents.
This was slightly lower than arson, significantly lower than
extortion, and almost certainly much lower than use of
explosives. When burglary is extended to non-structures, it
seems probable that the incidence of injury will be even
lower.
Comparisons with some of the other NIBRS offenses
tend to support the notion that burglary of non-structures is
less dangerous than burglary of structures. According to the
NIBRS data, theft from a motor vehicle was almost never
associated with injury (0.09 percent). Theft from a building
(which NIBRS essentially defines as theft from within an
open-to-the-public building other than a retail store) was
associated with injury only half as often as generic burglary
(0.49 percent versus 1.02 percent). Theft from coin-
operated machine or device—which one might think would
provoke violent confrontation at a frequency moderately
close to generic burglary—actually was associated with
injury only 0.16 percent of the time. As the BJS study of
residential burglaries suggests, it seems that there is
something especially dangerous about burglaries of
dwellings.72
If all nongeneric burglary statutes were grouped
together into a single category falling outside the residual
clause, burglary would become a binary proposition for
ACCA purposes. If the statute is generic, the resulting
conviction would qualify as ‘‘burglary’’; if the statute is
nongeneric, the resulting conviction would not qualify
under any portion of ACCA. This would simplify existing
law considerably. The lower courts are currently split on
whether nongeneric burglary qualifies under the residual
clause.73
The nongeneric burglary statutes of four states come up
frequently in reported opinions: Ohio, Oregon, California,
and Florida. The Ohio and Oregon statutes are nongeneric
because they include enclosures that are not fixed struc-
tures. The Ohio statute includes ‘‘watercraft, aircraft, rail-
road car[s], truck[s], trailer[s], [and] tent[s].’’74 The Oregon
statute includes ‘‘any booth, vehicle, boat, aircraft or other
structure adapted for overnight accommodation of persons
or for carrying on business therein.’’75 The California bur-
glary statute is unique in that it essentially treats shoplifting
as burglary, a point emphasized by the Court in Descamps v.
United States.76 The Florida burglary statute is also unique
in that it defines a structure as including the curtilage,
which in turn is limited to surrounding area that has been
enclosed.77
It is doubtful whether burglaries of boats, planes, and
other vehicles present as serious a risk of injury as bur-
glaries of structures. The most analogous offense in the
NIBRS data, theft from a motor vehicle, was associated with
injury in only 0.09 percent of the incidents. With specific
respect to the Oregon statute, the mere fact that a vehicle
may have been ‘‘adapted for overnight accommodation of
persons or for carrying on business therein’’ would not
seem to make much difference.78 Generic burglary is
already at the bottom of the risk continuum for enumerated
offenses. Any further attenuation of the risk would indicate
exclusion from the residual clause.
With respect to California, the NIBRS data indicate that
shoplifting was associated with injury in 0.39 percent of the
incidents. This is less than half the injury frequency for
generic burglary. Although we have no data on what per-
centage of California burglary convictions are for what
amounts to shoplifting, the presence of any such convic-
tions attenuates an already low injury frequency for generic
burglary.
With respect to the Florida statute, the inclusion of
curtilage seems significant. Although it is true that the
area must be enclosed to count as curtilage, that still
includes garages, sheds, carports, and enclosed storage
areas that might be quite distant from living quarters.
Thefts from motor vehicles parked at residences would
seem to have a similar frequency of injury to burglaries
of residential garages and carports. Yet that figure is
apparently quite low. Again, considering the already low
injury frequency for generic burglary, further decreases
in risk should raise red flags regarding residual clause
inclusion.
We are mindful that our suggestion regarding nonge-
neric burglary is in some tension with language in James.
There, the Court rejected arguments that canons of stat-
utory construction require an interpretation of the resid-
ual clause that only allows burglary to qualify under the
residual clause if it constitutes generic burglary under
Taylor.79 The James Court stated that the residual clause
may ‘‘cover conduct that is outside the strict definition of,
but nevertheless similar to, generic burglary.’’80 In hold-
ing that a conviction under the Florida attempted burglary
statute qualified under the residual clause, the Court
stated that the risk of injury did not stem primarily from
the possibility of confrontation upon a successful break-in.
Instead, the risk stems from the possibility that ‘‘some
innocent party may appear on the scene while the break-in
is occurring.’’81 That innocent person could be a property
owner or law enforcement officer. In the absence of ‘‘hard
statistics,’’ the Court was unwilling to find that either
attempted burglary or nongeneric burglary necessarily fell
outside the residual clause.82 Now, however, in light of
NIBRS offenses analogous to nongeneric burglary that
carry very low frequencies of injury, this conclusion is ripe
for reconsideration.
Appendix A
These definitions, excerpted from the NIBRS 2010
CODEBOOK (infra note 16), reflect the offense definitions
in use by the FBI during the time frame in which the 2010
NIBRS data relied upon in this study were collected.
Offense Definitions
200 Arson
To unlawfully and intentionally damage, or attempt to
damage, any real or personal property by fire or incendiary
device.
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13A Aggravated Assault
An unlawful attack by one person upon another wherein
the offender uses a weapon or displays it in a threatening
manner, or the victim suffers obvious severe or aggravated
bodily injury involving apparent broken bones, loss of teeth,
possible internal injury, severe laceration, or loss of
consciousness.
13B Simple Assault
An unlawful physical attack by one person upon another
where neither the offender displays a weapon, nor the
victim suffers obvious severe or aggravated bodily injury
involving apparent broken bones, loss of teeth, possible
internal injury, severe laceration, or loss of consciousness.
13C Intimidation
To unlawfully place another person in reasonable fear of
bodily harm through the use of threatening words and/or
other conduct, but without displaying a weapon or sub-
jecting the victim to actual physical attack.
220 Burglary/Breaking and Entering
The unlawful entry into a building or other structure with
the intent to commit a felony or a theft.
35A Drug/Narcotic Violations
The unlawful cultivation, manufacture, distribution, sale,
purchase, use, possession, transportation, or importation of
any controlled drug or narcotic substance.
35B Drug Equipment Violations
The unlawful cultivation, manufacture, distribution, sale,
purchase, use, possession, or transportation of equipment
or devices utilized in preparing and/or using drugs or
narcotics.
210 Extortion/Blackmail
To unlawfully obtain money, property, or any other thing of
value, either tangible or intangible, through the use or
threat of force, misuse of authority, threat of criminal
prosecution, threat of destruction of reputation or social
standing, or through other coercive means.
100 Kidnapping/Abduction
The unlawful seizure, transportation, and/or detention of
a person against his/her will or of a minor without the
consent of his/her custodial parent(s) or legal guardian.
23A Pocket-picking
The theft of articles from another person’s physical pos-
session by stealth where the victim usually does not become
immediately aware of the theft.
23B Purse-snatching
The grabbing or snatching of a purse, handbag, etc., from
the physical possession of another person.
23C Shoplifting
The theft by someone other than an employee of the victim
of goods or merchandise exposed for sale.
23D Theft From Building
A theft from within a building which is either open to the
general public or to which the offender has legal access.
23E Theft From Coin-Operated Machine or Device
A theft from a machine or device that is operated or acti-
vated by the use of coins.
23F Theft From Motor Vehicle
The theft of articles from a motor vehicle, locked or
unlocked.
240 Motor Vehicle Theft
The theft of a motor vehicle.
120 Robbery
The taking or attempting to take anything of value under
confrontational circumstances from the control, custody, or
care of another person by force or threat of force or violence
and/or by putting the victim in fear of immediate harm.
11A Forcible Rape
The carnal knowledge of a person, forcibly and/or against
that person’s will; or not forcibly or against the person’s will
where the victim is incapable of giving consent because of
his/her temporary or permanent mental or physical inca-
pacity (or because of his/her youth).
11B Forcible Sodomy
Oral or anal sexual intercourse with another person, forc-
ibly and/or against that person’s will; or not forcibly or
against the person’s will where the victim is incapable of
giving consent because of his/her youth or because of his/
her temporary or permanent mental or physical incapacity.
11C Sexual Assault With An Object
To use an object or instrument to unlawfully penetrate,
however slightly, the genital or anal opening of the body of
another person, forcibly and/or against that person’s will;
or not forcibly or against the person’s will where the victim
is incapable of giving consent because of his/her youth or
because of his/her temporary or permanent mental or
physical incapacity.
11D Forcible Fondling
The touching of the private body parts of another person for
the purpose of sexual gratification, forcibly and/or against
that person’s will; or, not forcibly or against the person’s
will where the victim is incapable of giving consent because
of his/her youth or because of his/her temporary or per-
manent mental incapacity.
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36B Statutory Rape
Nonforcible sexual intercourse with a person who is under
the statutory age of consent.
520 Weapon Law Violations
The violation of laws or ordinances prohibiting the manu-
facture, sale, purchase, transportation, possession, con-
cealment, or use of firearms, cutting instruments,
explosives, incendiary devices, or other deadly weapons.
Notes
* The authors would like to thank Josh Martin, Kathryn Tague,
and Barbara Tolbert for their outstanding research
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1 See, e.g., James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007)
(attempted burglary counts as a violent felony for purposes
of the residual clause); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137
(2008) (driving while intoxicated does not qualify as a violent
felony for residual clause purposes as it is too different from
the example crimes listed by Congress in the statute);
Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009) (felonious
escape under Illinois law does not count as a violent crime
under the residual clause); Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. __
(2011) (eluding a peace officer in a motor vehicle counts as
a violent felony under the residual clause).
2 The Sentencing Guidelines’ definition of ‘‘crime of violence’’
almost perfectly parallels the ACCA’s definition of ‘‘violent
crime,’’ and therefore contains a like-worded residual clause.
Compare U.S.S.G. 2013 § 4B1.2 with 18 U.S.C. §
924(e)(2)(B).
3 Chambers, 555 U.S. at 134 (Alito, J., dissenting) (‘‘At this
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deemed to be worthy of ACCA’s sentencing enhancement’’).
4 Sykes, 564 U.S. at *1 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (‘‘We should
admit that ACCA’s residual provision is a drafting failure and
declare it void for vagueness’’); Derby v. United States, 131 S.
Ct. 2858, 2859–60 (2011) (Scalia, J. dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (same). We take no position on whether the residual
clause is constitutional.
5 See, e.g., Sykes, 564 U.S. at *8–9 (citing statistics from the
International Association of Chiefs of Police, Bureau of Justice
Statistics, and U.S. Fire Administration).
6 Id. at *8.
7 We use the terms ‘‘co-occurrence’’ or ‘‘association’’ to denote
the relevant relationship between a given offense and injury in
order to avoid the concept of causation. We do not understand
the residual clause to demand a causal connection between an
offense and injury, but merely an association.
8 Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924 (1984).
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a felony must be punishable by at least one year in prison to
qualify under ACCA.
14 These eight offenses are: criminal homicide, forcible rape,
robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, motor
vehicle theft, and arson. Information is collected on these
crimes when they are reported or ‘‘known to police.’’ Aggre-
gate information also is collected on nineteen additional
crimes (Part II offenses), but only when an arrest is made.
15 For more detailed information about NIBRS, see Lynn A.
Addington, Studying the Crime Problem with NIBRS Data: Cur-
rent Uses and Future Trends, in Handbook On Crime and
Deviance (Marvin D. Krohn et al., eds., 2009); Federal Bureau
of Investigation, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING HANDBOOK, NATIONAL
INCIDENT-BASED REPORTING SYSTEM EDITION (1992).
16 The analyses presented do not include negligent manslaugh-
ters and justifiable homicides due to their small numbers
(n¼ 203 and 136, respectively) and because of a decision that
these offenses did not involve injuries that would be covered
by the residual clause. NATIONAL ARCHIVE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
DATA, INTER-UNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL
RESEARCH, NATIONAL INCIDENT-BASED REPORTING SYSTEM, 2010:
EXTRACT FILES, CODEBOOK, NIBRS Group A Offense Definitions, at
305–7, 309–24, Study ICPSR 33601 (2010) [hereinafter,
NIBRS 2010 Codebook], available at http://www.icpsr.umich.
edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/33601.
17 For certain crimes NIBRS requires completion of injury infor-
mation, even if the response is ‘‘none,’’ meaning no injury
occurred. Since this research is interested in actual injuries
associated with various crimes, to be counted, a victim in the
incident must have at least a minor injury. Available NIBRS
injury categories include: none, apparent minor, apparent
broken bones, other major injury, possible internal injury, loss
of teeth, severe laceration, and unconsciousness.
18 Justice Research and Statistics Association (JRSA), n.d, ‘‘Sta-
tus of NIBRS in the States,’’ available at http://www.jrsa.org/
ibrrc/background-status/nibrs_states.shtml.
19 Id.
20 But see Lynn A. Addington, Assessing the Extent of Non-
Response Bias on NIBRS Estimates of Violent Crime, 24 J.
Contemp. Crim. Justice 32 (2008).
21 See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 665 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2012);
United States v. Chazen, 2012 WL 1033343 (8th Cir. 2012);
United States v. Ford, 363 Fed. Appx. 903 (3d Cir. 2010);
United States v. Bethea, 603 F.3d 254 (4th Cir. 2010); United
States v. Hughes, 602 F.3d 669 (5th Cir. 2010); United States
v. Pratt, 568 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Mills,
570 F.3d 508 (2d Cir. 2009); United States v. Lowery, 599
F.Supp.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Mathias,
482 F.3d 743 (4th Cir. 2007); United States v. Howard, 216
Fed.Appx. 463 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Lancaster,
501 F.3d 673 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Darby, 232
Fed.Appx. 917 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Jackson,
301 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Franklin, 302
F.3d 722 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Houston, 187 F.3d
593 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. Key, 145 F.3d 1327 (4th
Cir. 1998); United States v. Hairston, 71 F.3d 115 (4th Cir.
1995); United States v. Elswick, 2012 WL 542701 (W.D. Va.
2012); United States v. Madera, 521 F.Supp.2d 149 (D. Conn.
2007); United States v. Brooks, 2006 WL 2037429 (D. Me.
2006); United States v. Rivers, 2010 WL 4340974 (D. Vt.
2010) (magistrate judge).
22 See, e.g., United States v. Eatman, 460 Fed.Appx. 790
(10th Cir. 2012); United States v. Martin, 442 Fed.Appx.
871 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Young, 442 Fed.Appx.
755 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Jones, 400 Fed.Appx.
462 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Gautier, 590 F.Supp.2d
214 (1st Cir. 2008).
23 NIBRS 2010 CODEBOOK, supra note 16.
24 Although statutory rape, rarely associated with physical injury,
is nonconsensual in legal contemplation, it is often consensual
in everyday terms.
25 It should also be noted that that the listed crimes can appear
more than once (so they will appear in their own category/
percentage as well as when they co-occur with another crime).
26 It should be remembered that this study does not purport to
show what percentage of these crimes independently cause
injuries, but rather how often incidents involving the com-
mission of these crimes, in total, involve at least one injury to
a victim.
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27 Table 2 below uses 2010 NIBRS data and lists the percentage
of weapons law violations that co-occur with other offenses
that may cause injuries.
28 Sykes, 564 U.S. __.
29 United States v. Mincks, 409 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding
that second-degree statutory rape and sodomy were violent
felonies presenting sufficient risk of physical injury because
the two parties differed in emotional and physical maturity);
United States v. Eastin, 445 F.3d 1019 (8th Cir. 2006) (sexual
intercourse with minor daughter was a violent felony).
30 United States v. Sherbondy, 865 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1988).
31 United States v. Bishop, 453 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2006) (posses-
sion of a sawed-off shot gun presented a serious risk of phys-
ical injury).
32 That is, burglaries not meeting the generic requirement set
forth in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990). See, e.
g., Descamps v. United States, 2276 S. Ct. 133 (June 2013)
(California); United States v. Farrell, 672 F.3d 27 (1st Cir.
2012) (Massachussetts); United States v. Lewis, 330 Fed.
Appx. 353 (3d Cir. 2009) (Ohio).
33 United States v. Whitfield, 907 F.2d 798 (8th Cir. 1990) (car-
rying a concealed weapon does not present a serious risk of
physical injury).
34 Begay, note 1, supra.
35 United States v. King, 979 F.2d 801 (10th Cir. 1992) (uphold-
ing a sentence enhancement under the ACCA based on
a weapon law violation); but cf. United States v. Canon, 993
F.2d 1439 (1993) (finding that possession of a sap, an
inherently dangerous firearm similar to a black jack, presents
a serious risk of physical injury).
36 See United States v. Lofton, 2012 WL 1357503 (6th Cir. 2012)
(Michigan).
37 See James, note 1, supra.
38 U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2.
39 James, 555 U.S. at 206–7.
40 Id. at 203–4.
41 See Begay, note 1, supra.
42 Id. at 144–46.
43 See Chambers, note 1, supra.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 129, citing U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Report on Federal
Escape Offenses in Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007, at 7 (Nov.
2008), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Publications/
Offense_Types/index.cfm.
46 Sykes, 564 U.S. at *8.
47 Id. at *8–9.
48 Id. at *9.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Cynthia Lum & George Fachner, Int’l Ass’n of Chiefs of Police,
Police Pursuits in An Age of Innovation and Reform: the LACP
Police Pursuit Database 55 (2008).
52 Id. at 3.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 55.
55 Sykes, 564 U.S. at *9.
56 Shannan Catalano, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Victimization
During Household Burglary 1 (2010).
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2284 (2013);
see also Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599 (1990).
60 Sykes, 564 U.S. at *9.
61 Catalano, supra note 56, at 1 (isolating injuries to those that
happen when burglar encounters household member).
62 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
63 See Appendix A. If the perpetrator merely placed the victim in
apprehension of an imminent battery with no ‘‘attack,’’ NIBRS
would record it as ‘‘intimidation.’’ Id.
64 According to Wayne R. Lafave, Criminal Law 867 (5th ed.,
2010), the modern American rule on criminal assault is
a jumble. A few jurisdictions define it as an attempted battery;
a few define it as placing another in reasonable apprehension
of a battery, and more frequently jurisdictions define it as
either. Many other jurisdictions have no assault statute or
have a statute that defines assault in the way that was tradi-
tionally defined as ‘‘battery.’’
65 We approximated what this injury percentage might look like
by combining incidents involving simple assault with those
involving intimidation. We found that 41.9 percent of the
combined simple assault and intimidation incidents involved
a victim who sustained an actual injury. This percentage is well
above the 4 percent cut-off established by extortion.
66 See, e.g., United States v. Hampton, 675 F.3d 720 (7th Cir.
2012) (the portion of Illinois statute defining assault as
physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature did not
qualify); United States v. Royal, __ F.3d __ (4th Cir., Oct. 1,
2013) (Maryland second-degree assault statute reaches ‘‘any
unlawful touching, whether violent or nonviolent and no mat-
ter how slight,’’ and therefore is not categorically violent);
United States v. Carthorne, 726 F.3d 503 (4th Cir. 2013)
(Virginia statute defining assault and battery on a police offi-
cer did not qualify because the physical contact element could
be satisfied ‘‘in a relatively inconsequential manner’’); United
States v. Alston, 611 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 2010) (Maryland
assault conviction did not qualify because the definition of
assault was linked to battery, which in turn did not necessarily
require violent contact). Some post-Begay circuit decisions
have found assault convictions not to qualify under the resid-
ual clause because they were based on the portion of a divisi-
ble statute criminalizing reckless assault. See, e.g., United
States v. Holloway, 630 F.3d 252 (1st Cir. 2011); United
States v. McMurray, 653 F.3d 367 (6th Cir. 2011). Cf. United
States v. Lofton, 2012 WL 1357503 (6th Cir. 2012) (domestic
violence conviction does not qualify under residual clause). We
do not here take a position on whether the Court should
adhere to the Begay requirement that a felony must be ‘‘pur-
poseful, aggressive, and violent’’ to qualify under the residual
clause, or on how Begay should be interpreted in the assault
context.
67 See, e.g., United States v. Fortes, 141 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1998)
(possession of sawed-off shotgun falls within ACCA residual
clause); United States v. Johnson, 246 F.3d 330 (4th Cir.
2001) (same); United States v. Serna, 309 F.3d 859 (5th Cir.
2002) (possession of sawed-off shotgun falls within U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines residual clause); United States v. Bra-
zeau, 237 F.3d 842 (7th Cir. 2001) (same); United States v.
Childs, 403 F.3d 970 (8th Cir. 2005) (same); United States v.
Hayes, 7 F.3d 144 (9th Cir. 1993) (same); but see United
States v. Amos, 501 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. 2007) (possession of
a sawed-off shotgun falls outside residual clause); United
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States v. McGill, 618 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2010) (possession
of short-barreled shotgun outside residual clause).
68 See, e.g., United States v. Flores, 477 F. 3d 431 (6th Cir.
2007) (carrying a concealed weapon falls outside the resid-
ual clause); McCarty v. United States, 2009 WL 1456386
(M.D. Fla. 2009) (carrying concealed firearm falls outside the
residual clause).
69 See, e.g., United States v. Thornton, 554 F.3d 443 (4th Cir.
2009).
70 ‘‘Except as provided in subdivision (i), any person who willfully
and lewdly commits any lewd or lascivious act, including any
of the acts constituting other crimes provided for in Part 1,
upon or with the body, or any part or member thereof, of
a child who is under the age of 14 years, with the intent of
arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or
sexual desires of that person or the child, is guilty of a felony
and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for
three, six, or eight years.’’
71 See Appendix A.
72 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
73 See, e.g., United States v. Pakala, 568 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2009)
(3d degree burglary under Florida law qualifies); United States
v. Ramirez, 2007 WL 4571143 (D. Me. 2007) (same); United
States v. Holycross, 333 Fed.Appx. 81 (6th Cir. 2009)
(burglary under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2911.12(A) qualifies);
United States v. Leasure, 455 Fed.Appx. 564 (6th Cir. 2010)
(burglary under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2911.12(A)(4) quali-
fies); United States v. Mayer, 530 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2008)
(1st degree burglary in Oregon qualifies); but see United
States v. Lewis, 330 Fed.Appx. 353 (3d Cir. 2009) (burglary
under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2911.12(A)(1) does not qualify).
74 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2909.01.
75 Ore. Rev. Stat. § 164.205(1).
76 See Descamps, note 32, supra.
77 James, 550 U.S. at 213.
78 Italics added.
79 Taylor, 495 U.S. 575 at 599.
80 James, 550 U.S. at 212.
81 Id. at 204.
82 Id. at 210.
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